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Abstract 
Establishing the identity of an individual is very crucial in the present times. Biometric authentication has proved itself superior compared to 
the traditional password based authentication in many respects. Nevertheless, biometric systems are prone to a variety of attacks. The stored 
biometric template attack is the most severe of all the attacks. Hence providing security to this form is of prime importance. Moreover, 
biometric templates may reveal private information about diseases and disorders of a person.  Biometric templates cannot be reissued on 
spoofing. Therefore, apart from security; biometric templates should be imparted with revocability. This work secures the multimodal 
biometric templates by the crypto biometric fuzzy vault framework. Fuzzy vault suffers from certain limitations like non-revocability, cross 
matching and lack of diversity. The fuzzy vault is hardened with a password to overcome these limitations. Multi biometric systems are more 
resistive towards spoof attacks compared to their unimodal counterparts. This work extracts feature points from three different biometric 
modalities namely fingerprint, iris and retina. The password-hardened revocable templates are then secured in a multimodal biometric fuzzy 
vault. Passwords act as an additional layer of security apart from providing revocability. Combining the retina with the iris improves user 
convenience as both the capturing devices can be mounted in a single device.  Users having problems with eye biometrics can utilize 
fingerprint and vice versa.  The security of the multimodal password hardened fuzzy vault is measured using min-entropy.  The number of 
computations required to compromise the vault by brute force attack is also calculated.  
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1. Introduction  
 Biometric authentication technology has proved itself superior compared to the traditional token based and password based 
authentication methods. However, Password can be reissued on spoofing whereas biometric cannot be reissued when 
compromised.  Moreover, biometric leaks personal information to the attacker. Therefore this work proposes a hybrid 
multimodal template protection method for securing fingerprint, iris and retinal templates. 
1.1. Application areas of biometrics 
 Biometrics finds its applications in the following areas like access control to facilities and computers, criminal identification, 
border security, access to nuclear power plant, identity authentication in network environment, airport security, and issue of 
passports or driver licenses, forensic and medical databases. As biometric finds its applications in several high security area 
providing security to biometric template is of utmost importance. 
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1.2. Attacks against biometric systems 
A fish bone model discussed by Anil. K. Jain et al., [1, 2] classify the causes for different biometric system vulnerability.   An 
adversary can attack the biometric system at eight different points [3].   
These attacks grouped into four categories, namely,
• Attacks at the user interface  
• Attacks at the interfaces between modules 
• Attacks on the modules  
• Attacks on  the template database 
Stored biometric template attack is very severe compared to all other attacks.   
1.3. Attacks on the stored templates 
    One of the worst attacks on a biometric system is the attack against biometric templates stored in the system database. Attacks 
on the template can lead to the following three vulnerabilities, 
•  A template can be replaced by an impostor’s template to gain unauthorized access, 
•  A physical spoof can be created from the template to gain unauthorized access to the system   
•  The stolen template can be replayed to the matcher to gain unauthorized access. 
     When a person’s template is compromised he loses his identity. Compromised template cannot be revoked or reissued. A 
potential misuse of biometric is cross-matching or function creep, where the gained biometric information are used for purposes 
other than the authorized purpose.  In such case privacy of the enrolled user is lost. The stolen template creates several security 
and privacy risks. Biometric template leaks sensitive medical information about the individual. Therefore, apart from providing 
security imparting revocability is also crucial for the biometric templates. 
1.4. Template protection schemes 
  Due to intra user variability biometric data acquired will not result in the same feature set always.  Small variation in the 
acquired feature set produces very large variation during decryption. Hence, traditional encryption methods cannot be used for 
protecting biometric templates. The template protection scheme should have properties like diversity, revocability, security and 
performance. The template protection schemes are broadly classified into two main types as function transformation approach 
and biometric crypto system based approach. 
Function transformation approach is further categorized as salting and non-invertible transformation method. Biometric crypto 
system based approach is further categorized as key binding and key generation methods. Fuzzy vault is the key binding 
biometric crypto system based method. Fuzzy vault is tolerant towards intra user variations. Fuzzy vault eliminates key 
management problems. 
1.5. Fuzzy Vault 
Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic construct proposed by Juels and Sudan [4]. This construct is more suitable for applications where 
biometric authentication and cryptography are fused together. Fuzzy vault framework thus utilizes the goodness of both 
cryptography and biometrics. In fuzzy vault framework, the secret key S is locked by G, where G is an unordered set from the 
biometric sample. A polynomial P is constructed by encoding the secret S. This polynomial is evaluated by all the elements of 
the unordered set G. 
A vault V is constructed by the union of unordered set G and chaff point set C which is not in G. 
V = G U C 
The union of the chaff point set hides the genuine point set from the attacker. Hiding the genuine point set secures the secret data 
S and user biometric template T. 
The vault is unlocked with the query template T’. T’ is represented by another unordered set U’.  The user has to separate 
sufficient number of points from the vault V by comparing U’ with V. By using error correction method the polynomial P can be 
successfully reconstructed if U’ overlaps with U and secret S gets decoded. If there is not substantial overlapping between U and 
U’ secret key S is not decoded.  This construct is called fuzzy because the vault will get decoded even for very close values of U 
and U’ and the secret key S can be retrieved. Therefore fuzzy vault construct become more appropriate for biometric data which 
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possess inherent fuzziness hence the name fuzzy vault as proposed by Sudan [4]. The security of the fuzzy vault depends on the 
infeasibility of the polynomial reconstruction problem. The vault performance can be improved by adding more number of chaff 
points C to the vault. 
1.6. Multimodal Fuzzy Vault 
  Multi biometrics performs well compared to the traditional unibiometric systems [5, 6]. Multi biometrics provides better 
recognition accuracy, enhances very high security, flexibility and user convenience. Biometric templates are not revocable when 
compromised like passwords. Multi modal biometric fuzzy vault utilizes the advantages of multi biometrics.  It is very difficult 
for an attacker to compromise multi biometric fuzzy vault.  
The proposed work constructs a multimodal fuzzy vault by combining feature point set from three different biometric 
modalities say fingerprint, Iris and retina namely Kf,  Ki and Kr.  Then Chaff points are added to the vaults to conceal the genuine 
points. 
Vf i r  = (Kf U Ki U Kr U C) 
The Chaff points are generated in such a way that they do not lie on   Kf,  Ki and Kr.  In this proposed vault the secret S is 
locked by three unordered sets U1, U2 and U3. 
1.7. Limitation of Fuzzy Vault Scheme  
Fuzzy vault being a proven scheme has its own limitations [7]. 
• The same biometric data cannot be used to construct a new vault when it is compromised. Fuzzy vault suffers from non-
revocability and cross-matching.   
• It is possible to attack the vault by performing statistical analysis on the vault points. 
• The attacker can substitute few points from his own biometric feature as chaff points.  Now the vault authenticates for the 
legal user as well as the  imposter for the same biometric template. 
• The impostor can glean the original template when it is exposed temporarily. 
To overcome the limitations of fuzzy vault, password is used as an additional authentication factor.  The proposed multimodal 
fuzzy vault is hardened by password. This enhances the user-privacy and adds an additional level of security. 
1.8. Fuzzy Vault Hardening 
  The hardened fuzzy vault overcomes the limitations of non-revocability and cross-matching by introducing an additional 
layer of security by password.  If the password is compromised the basic security and privacy provided by the fuzzy vault is not 
affected. However, a compromised password makes the security level same as that of a fuzzy vault. Therefore, security of the 
password is crucial.  It is very difficult for an attacker to compromise both the biometric template and the password at the same 
time.  The work constructs multimodal biometric fuzzy vaults using the feature points extracted from retina, iris and fingerprint. 
The multimodal biometric fuzzy vault is then hardened using the password. 
1.8.1. Steps in multimodal hardening scheme 
Step 1: A random transformation function is derived from the user password. 
Step 2: The password transformed function is applied to the first biometric modality fingerprint template. 
Step 3: The password transformed function is applied to the second biometric modality iris   template.
Step 4: The password transformed function is applied to the third biometric modality retina template. 
Step 5: Fuzzy vault frame work is constructed to secure the transformed templates by using the feature points  
             from all  the three modalities. 
Step 6: The key derived from the same password is used to encrypt the vault.  
Fig. 1 depicts the steps involved in the construction of the password hardened multi biometric fuzzy vault with three biometric 
modalities.  
V.S. Meenakshi, D.G. Padmavathi / Procedia Computer Science 2 (2010) 195–206 197
 V.S.Meenakshi et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2010) 000–000 
Fig. 1 Steps in Password Hardened Multimodal Biometric Fuzzy Vault 
1.9. Attacks against Fuzzy Vault  
The specific attacks against fuzzy vault are categorized by W. J. Scheirer and T. E. Boult[8] as follows 
•    Attack via record multiplicity 
•    Stolen key inversion attack  
•    Blended substitution attack.  
Passwords and PIN can be reissued when they are compromised. Therefore, the biometric template protection scheme must 
impart revocability and diversity along with security. Fuzzy vault scheme suffers from non-revocability and lack of diversity. It 
is crucial to impart revocability to biometric templates as they are vulnerable to stored biometric template attacks.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 elaborates the related work.  Section 3 explains the proposed password 
hardened multimodal biometric fuzzy vaults. Section 4 discusses the experimental results and the security analysis of the vaults. 
Section 5 presents the conclusion.       
2. Related work 
  Juels and M.Sudan [4] introduced the concept of fuzzy vault. Umut Uludag et al [9] used the fuzzy vault to protect a secret key
and fingerprint templates. Karthick Nanda Kumar et al [7] enhanced and studied the performance of fingerprint fuzzy vault.  
     Karthick Nanda Kumar et al [10] password hardened the vault which is a hybrid approach comprising the concepts of salting 
and fuzzy vault. This approach apart from providing security introduces revocability and avoids cross matching of biometric 
templates across databases. Karthick Nanda Kumar[11] in his work clearly explained the fusion of multi biometrics and min-
entropy calculations to compute the security of the fuzzy vault.  
      E.Srinivasa Reddy et al [12] hardened iris based fuzzy vault and morphological operations are used to extract feature points 
from iris. The general vulnerabilities, issues and challenges of the biometric system are understood from the work of [13, 14, 1, 
2].  The work of Anil K.Jain [1] provides a survey on the vulnerabilities, attacks and solution schemes related to biometric 
templates. W. J. Scheirer and T. E. Boult[8]  illustrated the specific attacks against fuzzy vault. 
       The work of Anil K.Jain [5] and Karthick Nanda Kumar [11] highlights the merits of multibiometric systems. Sharat 
Chikkarur [15] discusses on fingerprint minutiae extraction. The work of [16] [17] introduced retinal feature bifurcation 
extraction. Anil.K.Jain et al [18] and Jung-Eun Lee et al [19] show the significance of Soft biometric is human identification.  
The password hardened retina based fuzzy vault[20] and password hardened fingerprint and retina based multimodal fuzzy vault 
[21] forms the primitive idea for the proposed work. 
3. Proposed method 
      As a result of the literature survey it is found that fuzzy vault is a proven technology for biometric template security.  It mixes 
the idea of biometrics with cryptography. Fuzzy vault eliminates the key management problem as compared to other practical 
cryptosystems. The security of the fuzzy vault lies in the polynomial reconstruction problem. Multi biometrics are more 
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significant than uni biometric systems. Password hardening is a hybrid approach to biometric template security. Hardening 
provides security as well as revocability. Anyhow, very few have worked in multi biometric template security and retinal 
template security.  Providing security to retinal template is very crucial as it reveals diseases and disorders of a person.  This 
method constructs a fuzzy vault by combining feature set from fingerprint, iris and retina. 
     The proposed work constructs the password hardened multimodal fuzzy vault in three steps. In the first step the fingerprint, 
iris and retina are subjected to random transformation using password separately. This process enhances the user privacy and 
facilitates the generation of revocable templates that resists cross matching. This transformation reduces the similarity between 
the original and transformed template.  In the second step, multimodal fuzzy vault is constructed to secure the transformed 
templates. The key used in fuzzy vault construction is randomly generated and transformed using the same password.  The key 
can also be generated from any one of the biometrics (say  the retinal structure or from iris structure or from the fingerprint 
features) for better security. In the third step, the vault is encrypted by the key derived from the password. In this vault, password 
acts as an additional layer of security.       
3.1. Extraction of Feature point from Fingerprint, Iris and Retina 
    The proposed work uses the algorithm of Sharat S.Chikkerur [15] for extracting the fingerprint minutiae. Fig.2 (a) shows 
the original fingerprint template and Fig.2 (b) shows the highlighted fingerprint template with minutiae points.  The following 
operations [12] are applied to the iris images to extract lock/unlock data. Canny edge detection is applied on iris image to deduct 
iris. Hough transformation is applied first to iris/sclera boundary and then to iris/pupil boundary. Then threshold is done to 
isolate eyelashes. Histogram equalization is performed on iris to enhance the contrast.   
(a)  Fingerprint Image (b)  Fingerprint Minutiae (c)  Red: Permuted Points and  
Blue: Transformed Points 
Fig 2. Fingerprint Minutiae Extraction and Password Transformation 
(a)  Localized Iris  Image (b)  Highlighted Iris Minutiae (c)  Red: Permuted Points and  Blue: 
Transformed Points 
Fig 3. Iris Minutiae Extraction and Password Transformation 
         The following sequence of morphological operation is performed on the enhanced iris structure.   
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(i)     closing-by-tophat 
(ii)  opening 
(iii)  thresholding  
Finally thinning is done to get structures as a collection of pixels. Now the (x, y) coordinates of the nodes and end points of 
the iris minutiae are extracted. Fig. 3(a) shows the localized iris image and Fig. 3(b) exhibits the iris image with the minutiae 
patterns. 
The method follows the idea of Li Chen [17] for extracting the bifurcation structure from retina.  Thinning and joining 
morphological operations are performed on the retinal texture. These operations highlight the retinal vascular patterns. Then the 
bifurcation feature points are extracted from the vascular patterns. The (x, y) co-ordinates of the fingerprint minutiae, iris 
minutiae and bifurcation feature points of the retina act as lock/unlock data for the vault. Fig.4 (a) shows the retina image Fig. 
4(b) shows the retinal vascular tree and Fig.4(c) shows the vascular pattern after thinning and joining operation. Fig 4(d) 
highlights the retinal template with bifurcation points.       
3.2. Implementation of password hardened multi modal fuzzy vault 
The proposed system is implemented in Matlab 7.0.  Fingerprint samples are taken from FVC2002 DB2 fingerprint database. 
Fingerprint images are resized to 256 X 136.  Retina samples are taken from DRIVE database. The retinal images taken from the 
DRIVE data base are resized to the standard 256 x 256 format. Iris samples are taken from CUHK Iris Image Dataset. All the 
images are resized to 256 x 256 gray scale images by bilinear interpolation for further processing.   
This implementation identifies the lock/unlock data by highlighting the fingerprint minutiae, iris minutiae and retinal 
bifurcation structures. The (x, y) attributes, of the fingerprint minutiae, Iris minutiae and retina bifurcation structure, where ‘x’ 
and ‘y’ represents the row and column indices of all the three biometric images are found out.  
The co-ordinate points are permuted before password transformation.  This is shown in Fig 2(c), 3 (c) and 4(e).  
Permutation and Translation operations are applied on the minutiae point and bifurcation feature points by using the password 
separately. The transformed feature points are protected in the combined fuzzy vault. In this implementation 128 bit random key 
is generated. This key can also be generated from the retinal structure or fingerprint or iris for added security.  This key is 
transformed by the 64 bit user password and is used to encrypt the vault.  
3.3. Feature Point Transformation 
The user password is restricted to the size of 8 characters.  Therefore, the length of the password is 64 bits.  These 64 bits are 
divided into 4 blocks of each 16 bits in length. The feature point highlighted in fingerprint template, iris template and retinal 
vascular tree is divided into 4 quadrants.  One password block is assigned to each quadrant. Permutation is applied in such a way 
that the relative position of the feature point does not change. 
Each 16 bit password block is split into two components Tu  of   7 bits and Tv of  9 bits in length.  Tu and Tv represent the 
amount of translation in the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. The new feature points are obtained by the following 
transformation [12,10]. 
                     X’u = (Xu + Tu) mod (2 ^ 7)                                                                                               
Y’v = (Yv + Tv) mod (2 ^ 9)                                                                                                                                (1)
                                                
Where Xu  and X’u  are the horizontal  distance  before and after transformation respectively. Similarly   Yv  and Y’v are the
vertical distance before and after transformation respectively.  This transformation is applied for fingerprint, iris and retina 
template.  
3.3.1. Fuzzy vault encoding 
The   transformed features are encoded in the multi biometric fuzzy vault. Password acts as an extra layer of security to the 
multi biometric vault.  It resists an imposter from modifying the vault.  For the vault implementation, unique points from all the 
three biometric modalities are combined together. Secret message is generated as a 128 bit random stream. This secret message is 
transformed with the password. The 16 bit CRC is appended to transformed key S to get 144 bit SC. The primitive polynomial 
considered for CRC generation is 
 gcrc(a) = a16 + a15+ a2 + 1                                                                                                                            (2)
In the combined set, the minutiae points whose Euclidian distance is less than D are removed. 16 bit lock/unlock unit ‘u’ is 
obtained by concatenating x and y (each 8 bits) coordinates.  The ‘u’ values are sorted and first N of them are selected.  The 
Secret (SC) is divided into 9 non overlapping segments of 16 bits each. Each segment is converted to its decimal equivalent to 
account for the polynomial coefficients (C8, C7 …C0).  All operations takes place in Galois Field GF (216). The projection of ‘u’ 
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on polynomial ‘p’ is found.  Now the Genuine points set G is (ui, P(ui)). Random chaff points are generated which are 10 times in 
number that of the genuine points. Both the genuine and chaff point sets are combined to construct the vault. The vault is List 
scrambled. The encoding operation for fingerprint and retina based multimodal fuzzy vault is shown in Fig. 5.      
Fig 4.   Retinal Bifurcation Feature Extraction and Password Transformation 
3.3.2. Fuzzy vault decoding 
In the authentication phase, the encrypted vault and bifurcation feature point are decrypted by the user password. Password 
based transformation is applied to the query feature points and the vault is unlocked.   
From the query templates of all the three biometric templates, unlocking points (N in number) are extracted. The unlocking set 
is found as in encoding. This set is compared with the vault to separate the genuine point set for polynomial reconstruction. From 
this set, all combinations are tried to decode the polynomial. Lagrangian interpolation is used for polynomial reconstruction. For 
a specific combination of feature points the polynomial gets decoded.  
In order to decode the polynomial of degree 8, a minimum of at least 9 points are required.  If the combination set contains less 
then 9 points, polynomial cannot be reconstructed. Now the coefficients and CRC are appended to arrive at SC*. Then SC* is 
divided by the CRC primitive polynomial. If the remainder is not zero, query image does not match template image and the 
secret data cannot be extracted. If the remainder is zero, query image matches with the template image and the correct secret data 
can be extracted.  In this case SC* is divided into two parts as the 128 bit secret data and 16 bit CRC code.  The decoding 
operation of fingerprint, Iris and retina based multimodal fuzzy vault is shown in Fig 6. 
(a)  Retinal image (b)  Retinal vascular tree 
(c)  Thinned and joined image. (d)Highlighted  Bifurcation  
feature 
(e)  Red: Permuted Points and Blue: Transformed Points 
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Fig. 5 Multi Biometric Fuzzy Vault: Encoding 
3.3.3. Parameters used in vault implementation       
The   parameters used in this combined vault implementation are shown in Table 1.  Chaff points hide the genuine points from 
the attacker.  More chaff points makes the attacker to take much time to compromise the vault but consumes additional 
computation time. The chaff points added are 10 times in number that of the genuine points.  
TABLE 1  Parameters for Combined Fingerprint, Iris and Retina Vault Implementation 
  
Parameter Fingerprint Iris Retina Multimodal 
No. of. Genuine  points(r) 30 28 30 88 
No. of   Chaff points(c) 300 280 300 880 
Total no. of  points 
(t = r + c) 
330 308 330 968 
List  scrambling 
(VS) 
Chaff Point  
Generation (C)
Polynomial projection Cyclic Redundancy Check Encoding 
(SC) 
Polynomial (P) 
Construction 
Vault(V) 
Fingerprint minutiae 
feature list TF
Retina bifurcation 
feature list TR
Iris minutiae 
feature list TI
Combined Feature List TFIR 
Secure  Data (S) 
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Fig. 6 Multi Biometric Fuzzy Vault: Decoding 
4. Experimental Results and Security Analysis 
The vertical and horizontal distances of the fingerprint minutiae, iris minutiae and retinal bifurcation features are used for the 
polynomial projections for the combined fuzzy vault respectively.  The fingerprint, Iris and retinal template are transformed for 
three different user passwords to prove for revocability. Three different user passwords namely ‘security’, ‘template’ and 
‘quadrant’ are considered. Fig 7, Fig 8 and Fig.9 illustrate the password transformations for fingerprint, iris and retinal templates 
respectively.. 
Consider a 8 character user password ‘security’, the ASCII value of which is given by (115, 111, 99, 117, 114, 105,116,121) 
or 64 bits.  These 64 bits are divided into four blocks of 16 bits each and these are further divided into 7 bits and 9 bits for 
transformation in horizontal and vertical directions respectively.  
  
(a)  Password 'security' (b)  Password 'template' (c)  Password 'quadrant' 
Fig 7. Transformed Fingerprint minutiae
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The feature point transformation is done with other two user passwords namely ‘template’ and ‘quadrant’ whose ASCII codes 
are (116, 101, 109, 112, 108, 97, 116 101) and (113, 117, 97, 100, 114, 97, 110, 116) respectively.  For the same original 
template different transformed templates are obtained when password is changed.  This property of hardened fuzzy vault 
facilitates revocability.  Different passwords can be utilized for different applications to avoid cross matching and to provide 
diversity.   
     In the proposed method the security of the fuzzy vault is measured by min-entropy which is expressed in terms of security 
bits.  According to NandaKumar [11] the min-entropy of the feature template MT  given the vault V can be calculated as                
    
                H∞ (MT | V) =   – log 2                                                        (3) 
 Where  
 r = number of genuine points in the vault 
 c = number of chaff points in the vault 
 t = the total number of points in the vault (r + c)  
 n = degree of the polynomial 
 In order to decode a polynomial of degree n, (n+1) points are required. The security of the fuzzy vault can be increased by 
increasing the degree of the vault. Polynomial with lesser degree can be easily reconstructed by the attacker. Polynomial with 
(a)  Password 'security' (b)  Password 'template' (c)  Password 'quadrant' 
Fig 8. Transformed Retinal Features 
(b)  Password  'security' (b)  Password 'template' (c) Password 'quadrant' 
Fig 9. Transformed Iris Minutiae 
r 
n + 1 
r + c 
n + 1 
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higher degree increases security and requires lot of computational effort. This makes more memory consumption and makes the 
system slow. However they are hard to reconstruct. 
  In the case of the vault with polynomial degree n, if the adversary uses brute force attack, the attacker has to try total of (t, n+ 
1) combinations of n + 1 element each. Only (r, n+1) combinations are required to decode the vault.  Hence, for an attacker to 
decode the vault it takes C(t, n+1) / C(r, n+1) evaluations.  
The guessing entropy for an 8 ASCII character password falls in the range of 18 – 30 bits.  Therefore, this entropy is added 
with the vault entropy. The security analysis of the password hardened multi biometric fuzzy vault is shown in Table 2.  From the 
table 2 it is clear that multimodal fuzzy vaults are stronger to attacks compared to their unimodal fuzzy vault. Password 
hardening increases the strength of the vault. Compared to the vaults in [20] [21], the vault with three modalities is stronger but 
requires more computation time. If the number of feature points is less than (n+1) then Failure to Capture Rate occurs (FTCR). 
Multi modal biometric fuzzy vault minimizes the FTCR.     
  Hardening approach is a hybrid approach comprising of salting and fuzzy vault.  Salting provides revocability and diversity 
and fuzzy vault provides high security. Salting prevents attacks via record Multiplicity and provides diversity and revocability. 
Encryption prevents against blended substitution and stolen key inversion attacks [1, 10]. 
From Table 2 comparison of   password hardened unimodal fuzzy vault and multimodal fuzzy vault can be done.  
As more number of points are there in the multimodal fuzzy vault the strength of the vault increases.  Therefore the attacker has 
to try more number of combinations to decode the vault. Security of fuzzy vault increases as the number of modalities increases. 
It consumes time for encoding and decoding operations of the fuzzy vault with three modalities namely fingerprint iris and retina.   
Anyhow, it is computationally very hard for an attacker to compromise the vault as all the three modalities and password cannot 
be gained by the attacker at the same time. It is obvious that hardened vault more secured compared to their unhardened 
components.  Moreover, Hardened vault possess revocability and diversity.  
TABLE 2 : SECURITY ANALYSIS OF  THE  PASSWORD HARDENED MULTI BIOMETRIC FUZZY VAULT
5. Conclusion 
  To ensure security and revocability, this work implemented a hybrid template protection approach combining password 
hardening which is salting and then applying fuzzy vault.  This work also compares the security of the unimodal and multimodal 
fuzzy vault. Password hardening of the multi biometric fuzzy vault introduces two layers of security namely password and 
biometrics. It is computationally very hard for an attacker to compromise the password hardened multimodal biometric fuzzy 
vault.  Vault can be captured by the attacker only if he compromises all the three biometrics and password simultaneously. This 
is not possible in real life situation as it requires more computational effort. The proposed password hardened multi biometric 
fuzzy vault is robust against stored biometric template attacks. User convenience is increased by combining iris and retinal 
capturing cameras in a single device.  Biometrics traits like iris and retina are internal parts of human and are less prone to 
damage.  They can be employed with other biometric traits like fingerprint in high security applications. Multi biometrics 
overcomes some of the limitations of uni biometrics.  The possibility of Failure to Capture Rate (FTCR) is very less in this 
implementation. Password hardened Multimodal biometric fuzzy vault are revocable and more secure. Anyhow, this vault with 
Vault Type Degree of 
polynomial 
Min-
entropy of 
the vault(in 
security 
bits) 
Total no: of 
combinations tried 
to decode the vault 
Combinations 
Required to decode 
the vault 
No: of 
Evaluations 
Min-entropy 
+ guessing 
entropy of the 
password 
(in security bit ) 
Iris 8 33 6.1088 X 10 16 6.9069 X10 6 8.8445 X 10 9 51 to 63 
Retina 8 33 1.1457 X 10 17 1.4307 X 10 7 8.0079 X 10 9 51 to 63 
Fingerprint 8 33 1.1457 X 10 17 1.4307 X 10 7 8.0079 X 10 9 51 to 63 
Combined 
Iris and Retina 
10 39 1.6377X 10 23 2.2769 X 10 11 7.1925 X 10 11 57 to 69 
Combined 
Fingerprint and Retina 
10 39 2.3848 X 10 23 3.4270 X10 11 6.9587 X 10 11 57 to 69 
Combined 
Fingerprint and Iris 
10 39 1.6377X 10 23 2.2769 X 10 11 7.1925 X 10 11 57 to 69 
Combined 
Fingerprint, Iris  and 
Retina 
15 67 2.3872 x 10 37 1.4477 x 10 17 1.6487 x 10 20 85  to 97 
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three modalities takes much time for the encoding and decoding operations for polynomial of higher degree. Better hybrid 
schemes which are computationally fast can be explored.    
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